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Abstract: Empirical data on food sharing in native Dolgan, Nganasan, and
Nenets communities in Siberia provide evidence for hunter control over
big game and fish, as well as likely benefits of inter-household sharing.
Most food sharing occurs with kin and, thus, kin-selection-based nepotism
cannot be ruled out. Reciprocal interhousehold sharing at meals occurs
less often. Social context is discussed.
After describing four evolutionary hypotheses on hunter-gatherer
food sharing, Gurven presents four key latent variables useful as
indicators for evaluating nonmarket food transfer documented in
ethnographic settings: depth, breadth, equality, and balance. Spe-
cific combinations of values for these variables as predictions for
the explanatory models make the article a valuable contribution
for those collecting field data on food sharing in the human-be-
havioral-ecology framework. Potential complications include: the
specific combination of strategies characterizing food transfer
based on given relationships in an ego’s social network, the stage
of food distribution, the type of resource being procured, the po-
sition in the life cycle, and local definitions of success.
Empirical research on food sharing among Dolgan and
Nganasan in the Taimyr Autonomous Region in the Siberian Arc-
tic shows the influence of a number of variables and models de-
pending on the social context. For example, in the 1995-to-1996
period, 814 food-consumption events were observed in three
types of locations in everyday settings. Of these meals, 546 cases
included two or more native participants. In the regional capital,
Dudinka, the majority of dyadic relationships at shared meals
comprised mostly cognatic relatives, along with some friends. The
majority of participants were female. In remote communities, in-
cluding Ust’-Avam, Tukhard, and Kresty-Taimyrskii, cognatic
dyads were less common but spouse and affine dyads had higher
frequencies at shared meals. In most cases, affines represented a
visiting household. During hunting trips, at reindeer herding
camps, and at remote houses in the tundra, males who are close
cognatic relatives and friends were the predominant participants
at meals. The village and bush were the contexts under which
more interhousehold food sharing occurred.
A thorough analysis of food sharing for five households in the
Ust’-Avam area resulted in an interconnected network of 50 house-
holds. Seventeen households were considered to constitute the
core because the elimination of one dyadic household link within
this group would not isolate any of the other households. The re-
maining 33 households were peripheral actors, often connected
through one link only. Focusing on household dyads, just over half
were households related by kinship (44 of 84). Households related
by cognatic kinship were associated with the majority (331) of in-
terhousehold-meal observations (total 439) in Ust’-Avam and
nearby bush. Following predictions from inclusive-fitness theory
(Hamilton 1964) and generalized-reciprocity theory (Sahlins
1972), resource flow in this sample was most asymmetrical among
pairs of households related by close kinship. This asymmetry in-
cludes household relationships exhibiting one-way flows of re-
sources, especially from households with high producer-to-con-
sumer ratios to households exhibiting lower consumer-to-producer
ratios (i.e., young families). The context of much of this inter-
household sharing is one of children visiting and eating at their
grandparents’ or aunt’s and uncle’s house, providing further sup-
port for inclusive-fitness benefit.
Although non-kin also received meals in a one-way flow, such
sharing relationships were less common – one household, con-
sisting of an unrelated friend from outside the village, was hosted
throughout her one-week visit; in another case, a young appren-
tice was hosted throughout a hunting expedition. Resource flow
was more symmetrical, on average, between unrelated house-
holds, following expectations for reciprocal altruism and balanced
reciprocity. Meals hosted between non-relatives show more bal-
ance. Meals hosted with kin show depth and bias towards relatives
with children.
In a recent study, a number of independent variables were re-
gressed on the interhousehold food-sharing network (Ziker,
n.d.). The presence or absence of a kinship link between house-
holds was the most consistent predictor of interhousehold food
sharing at meals. The physical proximity of households to one an-
other is a marginal and weak explanatory variable, which drops
out of significance when other variables are added. Because
housing was assigned to families as it was built and became avail-
able in the 1970s through early 1990s in Taimyr villages, relatives
were rarely assigned living quarters in close proximity. Kinship
strongly influences food-sharing patterns independent of house-
hold location.
Reciprocal food-sharing relationships comprised 26 of the 84
household dyads (11 pairs of households in the core and 2 pairs of
core-periphery households). When rank-order average household
relatedness was compared to the rank of meals exchanged, the
Pearson correlation (0.663) was significant (p  0.014; two-tailed).
Genealogical relatedness structures reciprocity, and the unrelated
household dyads (3 of 13 pairs) received small total percentages
of food shared at meals. The depth of sharing with relatives (and
the asymmetry in the direction of young households) is highly
evocative of kin selection-based nepotism.
Local social definitions of cultural success and proper behav-
ior are also important for understanding food-sharing patterns
among Dolgan and Nganasan. Hunters generally transfer the ma-
jority of procured meat and fish to their elders or spouses upon
returning to the village, which implies a high degree of control
over resources but a conversion to family property (Ziker 2002a).
The elders or spouses (many of whom are the keepers of keys to
storage areas) redistribute the raw food to their close relatives,
especially those with children, as well as to friends and acquain-
tances in the form of either raw food or meals. Hunters and their
families give to those people who ask for food (especially single
mothers and pensioners), but they usually give relatively small
portions of raw food and host such people at meals more rarely
than relatives.
Although control is exerted at the kill and upon returning to the
village, local understandings of property require hunters or their
relative to share some portions of the catch with other people (oth-
erwise “the hunt simply would not happen”). In cooperative hunts
or fishing, the catch is usually divided equally among the partici-
pants. Signalling through food sharing likely factors into estab-
lishing long-term cooperative relationships with non-kin. Food
sharing with kin may also carry a signalling function in terms of re-
spect for elders and caring for relatives, who are supplied with
food without asking. This is not to say that food sharing creates kin
per se but that hypothetical signalling effects should not be lim-
ited to mating effort and long-term social-relationship building
outside of kin. It is not clear that consistently generous individu-
als receive prestige, support, or social insurance beyond kin and
close friends. Although claims of stinginess could carry a social
cost reducing the benefit of hunter control, such communication
is reserved for cases where the social relationship has already
soured.
Commentary/Gurven: To give and to give not: The behavioral ecology of human food transfers
BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2004) 27:4 571
